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I. INTRODUCTION
On the twenty-second day of October, 1967, the Israeli
destroyer Elath was on war patrol approximately thirteen miles
off the Egyptian port of Said. The Elath was a World War II
vintage destroyer of 2,500 tons displacement, yet in the
hands of her well-trained Israeli crew, she was an effective
surface combatant. In fact, some six weeks earlier, the Elath
and two torpedo boats had engaged two Egyptian PT boats off
the Sinai coast and in a running gunfight, both Egyptian
craft were sunk. And now, four months after their disastrous
and humiliating defeat, the Egyptians were about to realize
a small but significant victory.
In the harbor at Port Said, several small missile-armed
Komar patrol boats fired four missiles at the Elath. At a
range of about thirteen miles, the first of the missiles was
launched and was even observed incoming by the ship's crew.
The first missile struck the superstructure, knocking out
communications, while the second impacted moments later at
the engine room, leaving the Elath dead in the water and on
fire. Two more missiles were fired resulting in the eventual
capsizing and sinking of the ship. The entire naval world
took notice of what may have been the dawning of a new era

of warfare at sea. That a small 75 ton patrol boat could
have the impertinence to fire upon a destroyer, the backbone
of most of the world's navies, was not only alarming but
highly irregular. It is to this incident and the factors
relating to what has become the development of patrol boat
navies that this paper is concerned.
Although not a new weapon by any means, the fast patrol
boat has been adopted as the principal surface combatant by
many of the world's smaller navies. Fast, maneuverable, and
lethal, it has one more endearing quality: cheap! Depending
on size and electronics, a fast patrol boat may cost one-
tenth as much as a destroyer, yet have almost comparable
fire-power. These craft are essentially a coastal defense
weapon, yet, depending upon the circumstances, may have a far
greater role.
The Mediterranean Sea, in addition to the obvious factors
of strategic significance and political turmoil, lends itself
particularly well to the capabilities of patrol craft. A
miltitude of merchantmen ply the ancient sea routes while
super-power rivalry offers direct naval competition at the
front doors of the littoral nations. Thus, freedom and
control of vital accesses is always a pressing issue, not to
mention the protection of the "soft underbelly" of NATO.
8

Although it may not be within the capability of Morocco, for
instance, to attempt a blockade of the Gibraltar Straits
with patrol craft, it is however reasonable that she should
gain a certain degree of naval credibility in dealing with
attempts at certain forms of coercion or "the application
for political purposes of limited naval force.' As will be
discussed further in the study, one of the more realistic
uses of patrol boats is in the perceived "clout" offered by
a navy of credible capability.
The decade of the sixties saw the small nations of the
Mediterranean gradually become more patrol craft oriented.
For various reasons, the composition of certain country's
navies shows a high degree of reliance on missile-firing
craft, and has given them a naval voice of serious content.
Not only have the suppliers of military aid to the smaller
countries gained political allies, but by the nature of the
weapons supplied, may have gained a strategic military
advantage. While the U. S . -U. S . S .R. aid programs to the Middle
East have sought to maintain some semblance of balance, the
Soviets, by supplying missile boats to Algeria and Egypt,
Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy
, p. 21, Praeger
Publishers, 1971.

have given themselves a possible future option should the
need for a sea denial mission be realized. The act of
receiving arms carries with it an implied understanding
restricting their use against the supplier, and certainly
the Soviet Union would expect this.
A. THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA
This paper will examine nine countries of the Mediter-
ranean littoral proceeding south from Syria including Cyprus,
and west across North Africa to Morocco, excluding Jordan.
The navies of each country will be examined since 1960 and
data will be presented to show the degree to which emphasis
on patrol craft has occurred. Several factors will be
considered that have influenced the development of patrol
boat navies of which the most significant are U.S. and
Soviet interests in the area, as well as the technologies
which have made missile boats feasible.
The reasons for limiting the study to the countries
indicated are logical as well as functional. An analysis of
this type requires considerable data handling and care must
be taken in choosing appropriate samples from the population.
All the subjects considered are comparatively small, are non-
NATO, and have had direct interest in the tensions which
have gripped the area for so many years. Also, U.S. support
10

of Israel in contrast to Soviet support of the Arab states
offers a natural division for the study. To be sure, the
U.S. has supported the countries from Spain east across to
Turkey, but the emphasis here was in consideration of NATO
interests, 6th Fleet logistics, and countering Soviet moves.
While the U.S. mission has been primarily one of strategic
offense, the Soviets have been mainly defense motivated in
their quest to gain support for their fleet in the Mediter-
ranean .
B. THE CASE FOR PATROL BOAT NAVIES
Despite the overwhelming presence of 6th Fleet and Soviet
units in the Mediterranean, there is ample cause to justify
the need for a naval voice in an area so dependent upon
shipping and so painfully proximate to conflict. As with the
Elath incident, there exists sufficient opportunity for
continued naval engagement among third world and similar
level forces.
Thus, the advent of the surface-to-surface (SSM) anti-
shipping missile warrants particular consideration. It is
not the intent here to dwell upon the technical aspects of
missilery, nor even examine strategies of employment. Rather,
by describing the extent to which this element of naval war-
fare has developed in the Mediterranean, it may bring into
11

better perspective the implications for future trends.
There exists in other areas of the world great potential
for patrol craft utility, the cases of Cuba and Indonesia
being prime examples. An interesting phenomena of weapons
is that once in possession, there is a tendency toward
eventual use. Such can be the case especially with items
of high utility as in the example of naval combatants.
Naval craft have innumerable uses, both in peace and conflict
A well-armed cruiser has a striking aura about it and by its
mere presence conveys an impression of intent. A patrol boat
may not have this image of power in and of itself, in fact,
it is this very "unobtrusiveness" that gives these weapons
their unique appeal. Whereas an open act of hostility by a
major combatant draws concerned attention, the same act by
a patrol boat often appears almost self -defensive in nature.
Attacks upon the U.S. destroyer Turner Joy in the Gulf of
Tonkin by North Vietnamese craft were hardly considered by
many nations as serious acts of aggression, yet the U.S.
Navy obviously thought otherwise. The resulting Gulf of
Tonkin resolution by the U.S. government which ostensibly
legitimized naval action against North Vietnam was openly
questioned in many quarters. Nevertheless, patrol craft
did, although ineffectively, attack larger warships. In
12

another case, North Korean patrol boats captured the U.S.
intelligence ship Pueblo and again the brunt of disapproval
appeared to be directed at the U.S. The issue was more a
question of illegal electronic intelligence gathering than
piracy on the open seas.
In contrast, the U.S. sent the battleship Missouri in
1946 into the Turkish Straits to signify United State's
support of Turkey against Stalin's move to secure control of
that strategic waterway. The very presence of so awesome a
weapon of war unquestionably indicated U.S. intent, with the
result that Turkey did successfully resist Soviet pressure
to become a senior partner and re-negotiate the Montreux
Convention to her advantage. Thus, it becomes questionable
whether gunboat diplomacy will be effective when the country
subject to coercion can present in its own behalf a flotilla
of missile-armed patrol boats. It is not the actual capability
of a weapon that assures its owner, but what the owner per-
ceives that capability to be. The proliferation of missile
patrol craft in the Mediterranean adds a new dimension to
the naval picture.
If the U.S. 6th Fleet is to continue its mission of
naval presence and "showing the flag," it must also consider
the propriety of this strategy in view of the regard given
13

it by the emergent naval powers, small though they may be.
It is one problem to have Soviet forces lessen 6th Fleet
credibility and effectiveness, but quite another to find
that the third world has a voice of its own.
C. THE STUDY
The specific details of how the study was conducted are
outlined in the third chapter. Generally, naval order of
battle information was extracted wholly from Janes Fighting
Ships at five-year intervals beginning in 1960 through to
1975. Ship types are broken down into eight categories
based on speed and displacement and the number of units
falling into these divisions counted for the fifteen year
period. The main objective is to describe the evolution of
the various navies in terms of the proportion of patrol
craft to "other" types to ascertain what, if any, change in
direction and composition have occurred.
The second objective will be to present those factors
that have contributed to the development and direction of
these forces and thereby make a general estimate with regard
to future trends. The world has already been witness to a
2Blackman, R.V.B., and others, Janes Fighting Ships
,
1960-61, 1965-66, 1970-71, 1975-76, McGraw-Hill.
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half dozen incidents where patrol craft have played a major
role. From the sinking of the Elath, the Pueblo capture,
the Indo-Pakistani and Yom Kippur Wars, to the hijacking of
the container ship Mayaguez, patrol craft have found ample
opportunity for employment. While no merchantmen have been
deliberately attacked, it is not too -extreme to envisage
an irate terrorist group attack an oil-laden super tanker,
or belligerant tuna fishermen provoke certain countries
whose extensive fishing grounds they have violated.
3TIndian Osa missile boats attacked Karachi harbor during
her war with Pakistan in December of 1971 and accidentally





The Mediterranean, of all the world's waterways, has
probably exerted more influence upon the evolution of modern
civilization than all others combined. From the north of
Africa came Egyptian culture, while Europe produced the
Aegean and the extensive reaches of Imperial Rome. The
eastern shore witnessed the great religious gatherings of
the followers of Christian and Islamic faiths. The inter-
mingling there of so diverse an ethnic and religious heritage
presaged the conflict and turmoil that was to beset the area
in later times
.
The Mediterranean has been variously considered a high-
way, a basin, and a border. Not since the times of the
Roman Empire has there been a true Mare Nostrum. At that
time Rome was the center of control and fully protected her
maritime interests. There were few areas that could not be
reached bv sea with deliberate and effective action. And
Zartman, I. W. , "The Mediterranean, Bridge or Barrier?"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , v. 93, p. 64, Feb 1967.
Reitzel, William A., "Seapower in the Mediterranean,"
U.S. Naval War College Review, v. XIX, no. 2, p. 1, Oct 1966
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today, there is no one nation which can claim the Mediter-
ranean to be "our sea" in the sense that she could control
the elements of seapower required to substantiate that claim.
Despite the anxiety of Europeans who would indeed wish to see
a bilateral withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet naval units, the
divisive forces of economic, military, political, and social
upheaval should assure the continued instability of the
region.
At about the seventh century, the consolidation of Islamic
power along the southern half of the Mediterranean, and
European power along the north divided the area into a
horizontal split. This north-south delineation continued
into the 20th century as British naval power preserved well-
traveled trade routes. Yet, since 1945, the Mediterranean
has undergone a shift in orientation with the two superpowers
operating at extremes and the major accesses under non-
unified control. From the south, there is Arab pressure,
from the northeast, communist, and from the north, the NATO
alliance. What was once an inland sea dominated by those
who lived upon its shores , has now become dominated by






Thus, the Mediterranean has, by virtue of the political
pressures around the periphery, assumed the role of a border,
in view of the fact that commercial traffic upon it would
indicate highway. Today, the sea separates the Arab world
from the West. NATO forces have consolidated their interests
along the northern border, while European withdrawal from
the south has allowed for an Arab front. Although far from
unified, North Africa and the Eastern rim are becoming in-
creasingly free from outside control, despite Soviet moves
to the contrary.
Herein lies a key factor in the evolution of naval forces
along the southern littoral. The sea is essentially polarized
with the influence of U.S. and NATO seapower offset by the
Soviet presence. In addition, the polarity has offered the
Arab states the opportunity to extend their own influence,
both within their own ranks and outward to the rest of the
world. The absence of direct Western intervention has
offered a climate conducive to the growth of national power
as well as the need to have a recognized voice in matters
relating to their own interests. The transfer of arms in
exchange for military privileges as well as personal motives
The world is still struggling to recover from the
effects of ten-fold increases in the price of OPEC oil
18

has contributed significantly to the tensions and conflicts
of this century. Although naval forces have played a minor
role in the outcomes of what have essentially been land wars
between neighboring states, the value of a credible navy lies
in the diplomatic advantage provided in dealing from a posi-
tion of relative power. Again, it is important to recognize
that a naval force composed mainly of patrol craft is not in
itself a necessarily potent or formidable military component.
In the case of a small Arab state attempting to negotiate
diplomatic necessities with a superior power, there is less
inclination to be influenced by "flag showing" if in fact a
naval show of force can be maintained. In 1961, the govern-
ment of Iraq claimed Kuwait to be an integral part of Iraqi
territory. Due to a previously signed treaty, the British
government sent a commando carrier with marines to reinforce
the Kuwait border. The Iraqi claim was subsequently removed
in the face of overwhelming British forces. Yet, in 1961,
the Iraqi navy consisted of ten motor torpedo boats and four
motor gunboats as compared with units of the British navy.
Notwithstanding the moral and political issues of her claim
to Kuwait, the Iraqis were hardly in a position to challenge
Q






The presence of naval forces was apparently crucial to
the success of the operation, yet had the Iraqis been better
able to challenge British naval power, the outcome could
have been far more favorable for them. In fact, a credible
naval force would most likely have forced the British to
consider either an alternate means of landing tanks and
marines, or a more positive naval action. In all likelihood,
an attack by Iraqi vessels upon British men-of-war may have
ended in the destruction of the Iraqi navy altogether. On
the other hand, a show of credible Iraqi naval force would
have given Iraq a position from which to negotiate. Had the
British thus recognized and hesitated in the face of a
certain naval challenge, her resolve would have been suspect
as would the strength of her continued support of Kuwait.
Similarly, the need for a recognizable naval force has been
acknowledged by the subject navies of this study, and the
factors contributing to that acknowledgement are identifiable
throughout the history of the Mediterranean.
B. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
In the context of this study and for purposes of con-
tinuity, the Mediterranean will be considered in the same
perspective as the Middle East. Although the two of course
embrace somewhat different geographical regions, there is
20

sufficient overlap both in strategic considerations as well
as politico-economic ties to treat them as one.
In considering the strategic factors of the area, it is
necessary to think in terms of the international arena and
the degree to which the Middle East influences the conduct
of those nations with an interest there. Certainly, varying
levels of interest are involved depending upon the nations
themselves. The Soviet and American interests are in the
area of strategic parity and international influence. The
European countries, Spain, France, Italy, and the like are
concerned about the success of NATO in defending their
interests as well as free passage and the continued flow of
oil.
At the level of the states to which this report is
directed, levels of concern are primarily continued survival
as a nation and economic and political autonomy within the
folds of the Arab world. Despite the international reper-
cussions of the oil crisis of the early seventies, the
petroleum exporting countries are still highly dependent
upon the industrialized nations for most of those items by
which a nation functions: consumer goods, machinery, arms,
etc
.
Similarly, the importance of seapower is as applicable
to smaller nations as to the super powers. In fact, Mahan
21

lists three principal conditions of strategic value: posi-
Q
tion, military strength, and resources. These elements
have particular application to the eastern Mediterranean.
Certainly, the Dardenelles and the Straits of Sicily offer
great naval strategic significance by virtue of their
restrictiveness . Suez commands the canal route through
which oil-laden ships may pass. And finally, the confines
of the eastern basin are hardly suitable for super power
naval maneuvers, yet are ideal for patrol craft. In pre-
paring for war, Mahan observes the value in controlling
one's coast to prevent the enemy from bombarding or block-
ading. It is important to note that the Egyptian attack
of Israel in 1973 did not include an amphibious assault along
the Mediterranean coast where Israeli patrol craft had estab-
lished superiority. In fact, it was the harassment of Syrian
and Egyptial shore installations by Saar patrol boats that
forced the dedication of equipment for coastal defense that
could have been better used elsewhere.
q
^Mahan, RADM Alfred T., Mahan on Naval Warfare , edited




Erell, RADM Shlomo, "Israeli Saar FPB
' s Pass Combat
Test In Yom Kippur War," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
,
v. 100, no. 4/859, p. 118, September 1974.
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In terms of military strength, the Mediterranean navies
are comparatively weak by even Greek or Italian standards.
But Arab grievances are more directed at Israelis and other
Arabs than at Greeks or Italians. Thus, military strength
at this level is of considerable importance in view of the
limited resources of the participants and the supplier-
client relationships the arms trade has created. In this
regard, it has even been suggested that the Soviet favored
the conflicts between the Arabs and the Israelis because the
depeletion of arms resulting from war gave the Soviets the
opportunity to replace lost equipment and thereby strengthen
1 2their position among their clients. Yet, as the results
of the various conflicts have shown, numbers of arms are not
an indicator of superiority. In both the 1967 and 1973 wars,
Israel had considerably less equipment than the Arabs, yet
in neither war was she defeated. This, however, was due in
no small part to the roles played by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in
controlling the outcome to the extent that the status quo was
maintained.
Finally, the resources mentioned by Mahan are those wants
and needs of men and materiel that allow a modern navy to
12Blixt, Capt Melvin D., "Soviet Objectives in the Eastern
Mediterranean," U.S. Naval War College Review , v. XXI, no. 7,
p. 9, March 1969.
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function. Israel in particular is most vulnerable in this
regard for her land lines of communication would pass through
hostile country while the southern approaches via Bab El
Mandeb are subject to Egyptian influence. Thus air travel
and merchant ship traffic through the Mediterranean are her
only life lines. As will be shown, this lack of economic
independence among the countries of the Mediterranean littoral
is a significant factor in explaining the trend toward patrol
craft. The economics of maintaining a naval force are
extremely burdensome, for unlike aircraft or tanks which may
sit idle, there is little to be gained from ships that cannot
put to sea.
Politically, the eastern Mediterranean is as complex as
it is tumultuous. Whereas the past successes may have come
on the tides of armed intervention, it would appear that
today military factors are less important than diplomatic,
1 o
ideological, and economic ones. That is, it would be a
wise course of action for the super powers to approach Middle
Eastern affairs from the non-military view. The inherent
instability of the region should ensure continuation of
tensions from within, as Soviet success in exploiting Arab
unrest has proven.
JBrown, Neville, "The Eastern Mediterranean: A Fulcrum
of World Power," Orbis




Three major political alliances should be mentioned:
NATO, the Arab League, and CENTO. Basically, the main
purpose of NATO was to prevent the member countries from
falling victim to the spread of communism. This objective
has been realized in that no signatory to the charter has
come under Soviet dominance. There are two NATO naval
commands that would have responsibility for Mediterranean
security in wartime: ComStrikeForSouth commanded by the 6th
Fleet commander, and ComNavSouth, headed by an Italian Admiral
Both are under CinCSouth, an American Admiral headquartered
at Naples. U.S. membership in NATO is aimed at preventing
the spread of Soviet influence while the overall mission is
more one of defending the southern flank of Europe and
assuring control of the sea itself.
The Arab League was established in 1945 in part to dis-
courage the founding of a Jewish state. Headquarters are in
Cairo and Egyptian actions have strongly encouraged policies
against Israel while seeking League leadership. Hostile
attitudes among the Arab members has reduced the effectiveness
of the League while unity has been found in only one issue:
opposition to Israel. Despite the humiliating defeats at
the hands of the Israelis, the members of the League have
sought to keep the organization intact for several reasons:
25

because of its value as a common political front, a quasi-
regional organization recognized as such, and as an instru-
ment of propaganda. ^
CENTO is the official name given in 1959 to the original
Baghdad Pact of 1955, the defense alliance between Pakistan,
Turkey, Britain, and Iran. The United States, while not
joining, sent observers and provided some financial support.
The Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) was originally
created to discourage Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia.
The earlier aims of the Pact receded with Pakistan's associa-
tions with the U.S.S.R. and China. CENTO has become more
oriented toward cultivating economic planning and coordination
Apart from the obvious factors of geography that have
contributed to the strategic make-up of the Mediterranean,
it is worth discussing three key elements that help explain
the power struggle that exists in the area. Significantly,
it is this very power struggle and the attendant vying for
international favors through arms sales and military assist-
ance pacts that has led to the development of patrol boat
navies
.
•^Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th
Century
, ed. by Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine, p. 41,
The Jerusalem Publishing House Ltd., 1974.
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These fundamental reasons may be succinctly listed as
oil, Suez, and flanking advantage. It is this third
factor that probably most influences super power strategic
interests in the Mediterranean. It is reasoned that whoever
controls the Mediterranean, is in the advantageous position
of outflanking the forward position of the opponent. It is
to this very purpose that the 6th Fleet maintains a strategic
offensive capability in the Mediterranean: to maintain a
forward position from which a minimum reaction time retalia-
tory strike may be committed. With equal interest, the Soviet
Union maintains a comparably-sized squadron intended to negate
the 6th Fleet strike capability, understandably emphasizing
anti-submarine warfare to combat the submarine -launched
ballistic missile threat as well as protect her own units
from attack.
Oil has become as important a factor in the Mediterranean
as military advantage. The Middle East and Persian Gulf are
estimated to contain as much as 657o of the world's total
known reserves, while vast deposits have been discovered in
the Sahara. Oil sales are not only the principal sources of
15Roskill, Capt Stephen W. , "A Strategic Analysis of the
Mediterranean," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings Naval Review
1969
, p. 27, 1969.
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revenue for many of the Middle East nations, but the diplo-
matic advantages offered by control of price and quantity are
only beginning to be realized by such organizations as OPEC.
The Suez crisis of 1956 demonstrated the vulnerability
of the routes of supply. Thus, alternate fields in North
Africa were developed as a hedge against problems in the
Middle East. The safeguard of the Libyan and Algerian oil
industries became a Western concern, the U.S. after 1956
assuming responsibility for its defense west of Suez, and
Britain being responsible for the area to the east. In fact,
the surrender of Aden in 1967 and withdrawal from the Persian
Gulf in 1971 marked the end of permanent British military
presence in the Middle East. For whatever protection there
was to be gained from ties with Britain, her former protector-
ates were forced to accept the challenges of independence in
an arena marked by strife. The end of British influence was
the beginning of Soviet adventure. It was left to the United
States and those members of the Western Alliance to deal with
the security and integrity of the Mediterranean area.
The strategic significance of Suez lies not so much in the
geography of that waterway, but in the political and diplomatic
XDHurewitz, J. C, Middle East Politics: The Military
Dimension
, p. 73, Thomson-Shore, Inc., 1974.
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reversals due to the Arab-Israeli issue. Additionally,
Soviet attempts at influencing Egyptian control of the canal
have for the time being been nullified. Yet the instability
of the region offers a constant threat of erupting and
spilling over and involving the canal to some degree. In
most dealings with Egypt, it therefore becomes necessary to
take into account the need for a free and open passage.
Certainly, the U.S. Navy's interest in Diego Garcia in the
Indian Ocean, and the Soviet incursions in Somalia lend added
importance to a quick and easy access route from the Mediter-
ranean to points South and East. Additionally, despite oil
production in the Western Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf
oil fields will remain crucial to the needs of Europe and
the West, and thus "vulnerable to interruptions of petroleum
flow. The Soviets have apparently recognized the demands
and constraints of the situation as reflected in an apparent
shift in policy interest to areas south and east of Suez and
into the Indian Ocean. This is by no means a suggestion
that Soviet interests in the Mediterranean are diminished.
For what was essentially a "Western Lake" ten years ago is
Chief of Naval Operations, The Environment for the
Projection of U.S. Military Power in the 1980-1990 Period
,
p. 3, September 1973.
29

now as much a Russian-influenced operating area as what the
6th Fleet ever enjoyed.
Thus, the strategic considerations of the Mediterranean
are concerned with the military confrontation of the super
powers combined with the political uncertainties of the
Middle East. Additionally, the flow of Persian Gulf oil
through the Suez canal constitutes the jugular vein of Western
Europe. Those small nations astride this precarious sea route
have great potential with regard to playing significant roles
in future crises and gaining maximum benefit from the U.S.-
Soviet rivalry, while Europe waits and watches.
C. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT VERSUS NAVAL OPERATIONS
A persistent and somewhat valid argument against patrol
craft centers on their range and sea-keeping capabilities.
This criticism is particularly applicable to navies operating
out of regimes either facing the open ocean such as Morocco,
or from areas of known climactic intensities such as Norway
on the North Sea. But in the cases of Indonesia and North
Korea, both of which enjoy proximity to significant waterways
(Malacca and Korean Straits) , there is protection offered by
land masses and shallows. Not surprisingly, both countries
have made appreciable investments in patrol craft.
30

The Mediterranean, by virtue of limited reaches, moderate
climatology and strategic geography, is quite conducive to
small craft operations. Distances are small when compared
to those of the Pacific and Atlantic. From Gibraltar to Port
Said is slightly over nineteen-hundred nautical miles, and
Port Said to Athens is almost six-hundred nautical miles. In
that many patrol craft have ranges up to 2500 miles at six-
teen knots, distance alone is not that inhibiting a factor.
In fact, in 1974, the Israelis sailed from the Mediterranean
around Africa to Haifa without incident in two Saar 4 patrol
boats, proving the sea -worthiness of these craft.
The Mediterranean averages 1,200 fathoms in depth with
the maximum at 2,650 off southern Greece. The 100 fathom
curve lies fairly close to the coast except off Tunisia where
it is at 150 nautical miles, 10 to 40 nautical miles off
Syria, and 10 nautical miles from the Bosporus.
Currents are not particularly strong and the rise and
fall of tides negligible, except in the case of the Bosporus
where high winds may cause variations of three to five feet.
The prevailing winds are generally mild with weather condi-
tions most favorable in May and June. The Aegean may experi-
ence force 7 (Beaufort) winds from the northeast in summer





Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt have flat, sandy shores suitable
for landing, however, penetration inland would be difficult
due to the expansive sand dune and desert regime. Syria and
Lebanon also have flat beaches but with mountain ranges to
the rear. Peculiarly, the North African coast is devoid of
islands and most of the big cities and industries are close
to the coast. The northern Mediterranean on the other hand
has numerous islands, an irregular coastline with abrupt
coastal mountains and more diversely located population
centers. The implication here is that the countries along
the southern and eastern rim are especially vulnerable to
shore bombardment and amphibious assault. Thus, the need
for an effective naval defense of the coastal areas is readily
apparent.
Probably the single most important aspect of Mediterranean
strategy lies in the control of the strategic straits. The
Sicilian Channel divides the eastern and western basins and
is but 75 nautical miles wide at the narrowest point. Both
Malta and Sicily command the approaches to the channel,
although an alternate passage is offered through the very
narrow (1.5 nm) Strait of Messina.
The Dardanelles and the Bosporus separate Europe from
Asia and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet from the Mediterranean.
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The Montreux Convention of 1936 gave Turkey control of the
straits which somewhat limits Soviet passage and allows
Turkish rights of denial should she consider herself threat-
ened by war. These straits, because of their extreme
restrictiveness and ease of defense are of critical importance
to Soviet strategy in times of hostilities.
At the western extreme of the Mediterranean, the Straits
of Gibraltar control access to the Atlantic. The often
raised question over Spanish or British control of the
straits somewhat unsettles the degree of security NATO members
would prefer to feel regarding this vital waterway. Addition-
ally, patrol craft of the Moroccan navy have more than
adequate capacity to engage ships attempting to transit the
area. In fact, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, all of which
have acquired patrol boats, are in a position to exercise
control over the entire approach and transit through the
western Mediterranean.
Thus, it can be seen that the physical configuration of
the entire Mediterranean is suitable for the operation of
small craft, not only in range and tactical demands, but
because the sea is the setting for the rival navies of the
super powers and the NATO forces. A reasonable scenario for
conflict in which the Soviets were involved would see their
33

attempt to initially obtain control of the Turkish Straits. ^
This would be in concert with actions taken by the already-in-
place units of the Mediterranean squadron to neutralize NATO
and 6th Fleet forces. Since air cover would be vital to the
Soviet Fleet, they would most likely remain in the eastern
basin where their own aircraft could support them and enemy
aircraft from Western forces would be at a disadvantage.
In any case, a general or even limited action will see a
concerted effort to secure the entire Mediterranean by both
sides, with naval forces playing a major role. It is worth
speculating that those countries with naval forces still
intact at this time will find themselves in a highly fluid
position depending on their political committments prior to
the outbreak of hostilities and conduct in the interim.
18
M;[argaritis, VADM Constantine, "A Strategic Analysis of
the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea," U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , v. 99, no. 843, p. 140, May 1973.
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III. COMPOSITION OF NAVAL FORCES
The purpose of this study is to examine composition and
development of the naval forces since 1960 of nine countries
of the southern and eastern Mediterranean littoral. Emphasis
is placed on the degree to which fast patrol craft, especially
missile-firing patrol craft, have become a part of these
navies in terms of numbers as a percentage of the total. In
that missile boats offer a new dimension of naval capability,
offensive as well as defensive, it becomes quite significant
a factor in assessing the naval picture in this area when
strategic considerations are involved. Syria, Egypt, Tunisia,
and Morocco all lie in close proximity to the four most
important straits or waterways in the Mediterranean. Missile
boats are a part of each of these country's navies and thus
present a serious threat worth considering in the formulation
of plans and naval assessments.
The remaining five countries, Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel,
Libya, and Algeria complete the littoral rim of the Mediter-
ranean and in this regard, i.e., that of delimiting the
northern half of the area from the southern half, form in
part the logic for selection of states for the study. As
previously mentioned, the Mediterranean has become divided
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along an east-west line separating the European northern
half from the Arab south. Also, the division has other
justification. The ethnic and political composition is
distinct from the north while most of the conflicts of the
past decade have been inter-Arab or Arab-Israeli. For the
most part, super power involvement in the Mediterranean has
shown a marked delineation of interest and foreign policy-
conduct between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and the
countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, the
geography of the northern rim is fairly distinct from that
of the south, being mountainous with high gradient along the
coast, and having many small islands and land projections,
particularly in the Aegean area. In contrast, the North
African coast is flat and sandy with wide beaches and shallow
off-shore waters. The hinterlands are essentially sandy and
low but are higher in the areas adjacent to Syria and Lebanon,
The year 1960 was chosen for two reasons. First, because
most of the navies were either formed subsequent to that time
or acquired their patrol craft in the sixties. To be sure,
several countries had patrol craft prior to 1960 but were
not missile-equipped. The first units of this type were
Soviet Komars supplied to Egypt in 1962, and as will be
shown, it was the introduction of these craft into the area
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by the Soviets that contributed to the trend toward patrol
craft in the late sixties and early seventies. The second
reason for beginning the study at the 1960 mark was simply
for reasons of brevity. Little would have been added in
terms of supportive data and the purposes of the study were
amply met within the period chosen. However, a case could
certainly be made regarding the roles of patrol boats in
general for all the Mediterranean countries prior to World
War II. Cursory examination of trends were made in the
process of preparing this report, and the initial indications
were that trends revealed herein are similar for the entire
area. That is, the past three decades show an overall lean-
ing toward smaller and faster craft, with emphasis placed on
versatility and maneuverability. Overall average displace-
ment has become smaller, not because of attrition of larger
ships so much, but because large numbers of small craft were
acquired, thus reducing the average size.
For the purposes of classifying ship types to facilitate
counting, eight groups were established, all of which were
surface combatants. Thus, submarines, tenders, support ships,
and other auxiliaries were not included. Also, craft of
comparatively small size were omitted, such as the six ton
Firefish craft of the Israeli navy. The eight categories
37

are as follows: Destroyers (DES) , Frigates (FRI) , Corvettes
(COR), Mine Warfare (MIN) , Patrol (PAT), Fast Patrol Missile
(FPM) , Fast Patrol Torpedo (FPT) , and Fast Patrol Gunboat
(FPG)
.
A distinction was made between Patrol (PAT) and the
remaining patrol types as to speed. That is, a patrol boat
as listed in Jane's Fighting Ships 19 that has a speed less
than 20 knots will be classified as simply Patrol. For
example, in 1960, Syria's navy consisted of three 16 -knot
patrol vessels, and 12 40-knot fast patrol boats. The speed
differential is so great that the two types cannot be con-
sidered in the same class, especially in view of the fact
that high speed is one of the strengths of modern patrol
craft and which gives it great maneuverability.
Mine warfare craft are included in the naval-order-of
-
battle because they are armed and highly versatile, and also
because in some cases, minesweepers either made up the core
of a newly-formed navy, as in the case of Algeria who re-
ceived two coastal minesweepers in 1962 from Egypt, or
because minesweepers were a significant percentage of the
total as in the 1960 Egyptian navy.
19^For continuity, all NOB information unless otherwise




Three aspects of naval combatants are considered: total
number, displacement, and speed. There are other factors
that may be considered, but which are beyond the scope of
this report. As previously stated, the intent here is to
show the changes which have taken place in the last 15 years
in terms of composition, speed, and displacement. Analysis
of weapons is limited to the extent that missile-equipped
craft gives greater credibility to these small navies and
thereby requires serious consideration of what was heretofore
a minor element of the military posture of the region.
This section contains descriptions of the individual
countries and then treats the area as a whole. At the end
of each part, a graph is offered which depicts the elements
of each navy at five-year intervals beginning in 1960.
Figures indicate the conditions that exist at the indicated
time period. For example, the graph for Algeria indicates
two mine warfare (MIN) in 1965, although these units were
actually acquired in 1962.
A. CYPRUS
1. Political and Economic Structure
Cyprus achieved independence from Britain in 1960 in
hopes of achieving order out of the strife of over a decade.
The Greek majority sought union with Greece (enosis) and had
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conducted guerrilla warfare against the Turkish and British
minorities in hopes of achieving this. The Turks feared
Greek oppression and thus opposed enosis, resulting in
tension and endangering the NATO Alliance. The Zurich agree-
ment of 1959, signed by Greece, Turkey, and the Greek-Turk
Cypriots , forbade enosis and provided for safeguarding of
the Turkish minority rights. Today, Greece no longer favors
enosis but Turkey feels compelled to act in behalf of the
Turkish-Cypriot minority. The Makarios government has
rejected outside impositions as well as autonomy for the
two minorities, yet the situation remains unresolved. Eco-
nomically, Cyprus is mainly agrarian, with limited mining and
textile manufacturing.
2. Strategic Considerations
Historically, control of Cyprus assured control of
20the Eastern Mediterranean." This has been demonstrated by
British actions in two world wars and the staging of the
Suez campaign in 1956. Additionally, Britain retained base
rights on the island when she granted independence in 1959.
Communist inroads in Cyprus are feared as jeopardizing NATO
interests although in the 1970 elections, they were elected
^ uDupuy, Col T. N. and Blanchard, Col Wendell, The Almanac
of World Military Power
, 2nd ed.
,
p. 76, R.R. Bowker Co., 1972
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to nine seats in the House of Representatives. Finally,
Cyprus sits in close proximity to the shipping lanes used




The 1960 Constitution provided for four military
organizations with the Cypriot Army being primary and having
21
a composition of 60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turk.
But political turmoil caused the army to split into Greek
and Turkish factions, so by 1970, there were eight military
and three police forces on the island, with the Cypriot Navy
being formed in 1964. This small force was created by the
government along with the National Guard with the intended
purpose of reducing the infiltration of Turks and the smug-
gling of arms to support Turkish forces. The National Guard
and the Cypriot Navy are responsible to the Ministry of
Defense who is Turkish as specified by the Constitution, but
has not functioned since 1963.
4. Force Composition
In 1964, President Makarios requested aid from the
Soviet Union. Russian interest in Cyprus involved preserving
independence from Greece and Turkey, both of whom are NATO
21Keefe, Eugene K. , and others, American University Area
Handbook for Cyprus
, p. 209, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1971
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members. Although little data is available, it is estimated
that this aid was not substantial. 22
By 1965, one year after the establishment of the
navy, Cyprus had two patrol craft, a third having been
destroyed by Turkish aircraft. Three craft are listed,
however, in Table 1 as an indication of initial forces. Also
at this time are six Soviet P-4 FPGs which were part of the
aid package requested by Makarios . These 40-knot vessels
were ideal for dealing with the smuggling problems previously
mentioned.
In 1975, the Cypriot Navy has undergone little change
in either number or type, except that now the Soviet P-4s are
classified as torpedo craft (FPT) by Jane '
s
. Due to her
limited economy and political problems, it is doubtful that
the Cypriot Navy will undergo any radical changes in the
immediate future.
22^The Arms Trade with the Third World
. Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, p. 203, Humanities Press,
1971.













































































1. Political and Economic Structure
In 1958, Syria formed an alliance with Egypt, the
UAR, and between 1958-61, received aid from the U.S.S.R.
In 1961, Syria broke ties with Egypt, and despite several
years of pro-Western governments, continued to accept aid
from the Soviets. From 1963 until the present, the Ba ' th
Party has been in control of the government, and in a coup
in 1970, General Hafiz al-Asad came to power. Since as early
as 1946, the government has been increasingly influenced by
the military and has been one of the staunches t opponents of
Israel. Although the communist party is officially banned,
its existence is tolerated. The radio and press are com-
pletely owned or controlled by the party, mostly serving as
mouthpieces of the government.
Syria has an agrarian economy but oil has been dis-
covered in the northeast and in 1970, 4.5 million tons were
produced. Pipelines from Iraq traverse Syrian territory for
which transit royalties are received. Fertilizer industries
and irrigation projects have been undertaken to improve the




Syria's strategic importance lies in her position
along the "northern tier" and the effect her ties with the
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Soviet Union will have on preserving that defense position.
Secondly, the oil pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia which
cross that territory are not only subject to Syrian control,
but could be the object of foreign take-over. Of personal
interest to Syria is the aspect of Israeli control of the
commanding Golan Heights. It is reasoned that the capital
of Damascus is virtually indefensible against a determined
Israeli attack.
3 . Defense Structure
President al-Asad is both premier and defense minister
The navy is subordinate to the army and in fact, together with
the air force has the additional role of supporting the
army's ground force operations. The specific mission of the
armed forces has been to train and prepare for war with
25Israel. The navy maintains a small facility at Latakia
although most major repairs and overhaul must be performed
at foreign yards. Naval headquarters are also located at
Latakia where the director of naval operations has control





25Nyrop, Richard F., and others, American University





The Syrian navy was formed in 1950 as a part of the
army. In 1957, the Soviet Union supplied five motor torpedo
boats and by 1960 a total of 12 were on hand, along with
three French-supplied ex-submarine chasers."" In 1962, the
U.S.S.R. transferred two mine sweepers and in 1966, 10 Komar
missile patrol boats. In the June 1967 war with Israel, a
substantial amount of equipment was lost and by 1970, only
six of the Komars remained. In 1973, two Osa class missile
boats were received from the Soviets but apparently were lost
to the Israelis in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, but by 1974, three
replacements were furnished. By supplying the Syrian Navy
with the missile boats, the balance of forces (naval) among
the Arab States was seriously upset, as Egypt and Algeria
also received substantial Soviet aid. Recognizing the need
to establish naval parity, Israel transacted a deal with
France to deliver 12 Saar gunboats by 1968-69, while at the
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Political and Economic Structure
Lebanon has attempted to remain non-committed in the
inter-Arab disputes and declined to join the Baghdad Pact in
1955. She has maintained a relationship with France to the
extent that arms were provided, while in 1967, France publicly
stated her support of Lebanon's defense. The political frame-
work of the country is decidedly French in concept and unlike
many of the other Arab states, religious influences are more
dominant than military. Although Lebanon did not participate
in the June war, tensions with Israel have increased since
1965 and continued reports of Palestinian commando units
operating out of Lebanon have brought reprisals from Israel.
Beirut is a major world center for gold transactions and





Lebanon has shown two significant factors relating to
her importance. First, the non-military government has
attempted to play down the Arab-Israeli dispute while at the
same time displaying a degree of stability. Secondly, the
freedom of press and information, especially regarding the
Middle East conflicts, has made Lebanon a source of Western
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ideas and influence through which anti-communist sentiment
might be encouraged. In 1970, the U.S. Congress proposed a





The Lebanese Navy was formed in 1953 as an integral
part of the army, with the primary mission of coastal defense
and ant i- smuggling. The President acts as commander-in-chief
and has direct liaison with the Commanding General of the
Army. Naval headquarters are in Beirut where logistical
support is provided by the army. It is estimated that the
navy has little capability beyond that associated with main-
taining internal security, and, in fact, the entire military
due to its limited resources may be unable to defend the
nation against a determined aggressor. -^
4. Force Composition
In 1975, the total personnel in the navy numbered
about 250 officers and men. The principal supplier of arms
has been France who between 1955 and 1960 provided four
patrol craft. Also, in 1970, Libya offered up to 16 million
27Stockholm, op. cit.
. p. 553.
28Smith, Henry H. , and others, American University Area




in aid in return for Lebanon's pledge to participate fully
29in the battle against Israel.
The navy in 1960 consisted of the three French-
supplied patrol craft and one fast gunboat. Although not
considered for counting purposes, the force also had on hand
a U.S. landing craft transferred in 1958. The decade of the
sixties saw practically no change in composition until about
1970 when a fourth patrol boat was acquired, an old British-
built motor launch.
Thus, in keeping with the government's policies of
limited involvement, there seems little to suggest that the
navy will expand appreciably in the near future. Lebanon
remains however, a source of Israeli concern due to the
existence of Palestinian guerrillas within her borders. It
remains to be seen if the more aggressive attitudes of Syria
will continue to be resisted, or if the current civil dis-
orders will bring about changes within the political and
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1 . Political and Economic Structure
The history of Israeli politics is as profound as it
is complex, and full development of its origins and signifi-
cance is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say
that since the establishment of the Jewish State in 1948,
Israel has sought to maintain her existence despite the
vigorous objections of many Arab States. The Palestinian
question has certainly been a source of conflict as has the
treatment of non-Jews by Israel. Further, the acquisition
of land as a result of war far beyond that as proposed by the
original United Nation's resolution for the Israeli State has
exacerbated relations, especially from the Egyptians and
Jordanians. In this regard, Egypt has made peace offerings
predicated upon the return to the pre-war limits of 1967,
an offer rejected by the Israeli government.
Since 1960, both the U.S. and West Germany have
given political and military support to Israel, with France
supplying arms in quantity. However, France suspended aid
during the June war and after she resolved the Algerian
problem, began looking as early as 1965 for additional Arab
clients. In 1968, she agreed to sell Mirage fighters to Iraq,
while still imposing an arms embargo against Israel. Since
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France at this time was Israel's only supplier of sophisti-
cated arms, the embargo had the effect of causing Israel to
seek new suppliers. The competition by many of the Western
countries, i.e., United States, Britain, France, and West
Germany to develop arms markets in the Middle East had the
effect of enlivening the Israeli-Arab arms race.^ As
mentioned earlier, the possession of arms tends to beget
their own use, and Israel in particular was not acquiring
weapons for local demonstrative purposes but for employment
in combat.
Economically, Israel is one of the few countries of
the Middle East with the capability to manufacture weapons
and refurbish or repair used equipment. Industrialization
is widespread, although light, and efforts are being made to
expand into electronics equipment manufacturing. Israel has
produced the Reshef patrol boat, Gabriel missile, and a new
supersonic fighter, the Kfir, as well as assorted small arms.
Natural resources are minimal and the preponderance of
imported goods has created an unfavorable balance of payments
as well as a vulnerability to Arab boycotts.
2. Strategic Considerations
Within the entire Eastern Mediterranean region,






Suez and the degree of super power involvement proceeding
from their respective alliances and foreign policy interests.
Although it has been often speculated that the Soviets con-
vinced Syria of an impending Israeli attack and thus pre-
cipitated the June War of 1967, the super powers have
essentially adopted the role of observer during open hostili-
ties. At the outset of the June War of 1967, the Soviets in
fact took the initiative and used the Washington-Moscow
"hotline" to proclaim their intentions of non-interference.
Thus the two overriding concerns of the U.S. and Soviet
Union were to avoid direct confrontation and prevent a total
Arab or Israeli victory.
3 . Defense Structure
Control of the Israeli Defense Force rests with the
Prime Minister while direct responsibility for administration
of the armed forces is exercised by the Defense Minister.
About 75,000 personnel are on regular active duty, but in
the event of mobilation, this figure swells to approximately
300,000 within a week. It is this ability to activate
reserve personnel on short notice that allows the economy to
prosper while so many are subject to military service.
However, when a high number of reservists are kept active,





The navy keeps approximately 4,500 personnel active
but in the event of mobilization the number increases to
8,000, as individuals report to their duty stations within
3148 hours. The navy was originally intended to serve as a
small coastal defense force but the high degree of success
of the Saar boats and the need to defend interests in the Gulf
of Aqaba has produced an effective fighting force. Since
1967, three significant developments have altered the
strategic naval view: (1) increased length of coastline
since the June war, (2) the increased Soviet presence and
aid to the Egyptian Navy, and (3) increased probabilities
of an amphibious assault from Egypt to circumvent Israeli
32defenses. To achieve naval advantage in the face of
superior numbers, the Israelis strengthened their defense
perimeter to take decisive offensive action at every oppor-
tunity. Thus, the naval forces had been given an important
role in the country's defense, and the acquisition of the






Miller, Martin J., Jr., "The Israeli Navy: 26 Years
of Non-Peace," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
, v. 101,
no. 2, p. 51, February 1975.
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In 1960, there were 15 units of which four were
major combatants. Between 1968 and 1975, a total of 24
Saar and Reshef Class missile patrol craft had been acquired
in response to the Komars and Osas supplied by the Soviet
Union to Egypt, Syria, and Algeria prior to 1968. Signifi-
cantly, both destroyers are not listed in the 1972-73
edition of Jane's. This deliberate move away from large
combatants attests to the confidence the Israelis place in
their patrol craft to form the backbone of the new navy.
In fact, Israeli shipyards are now producing a successor to
the Saar. The Reshef is said to have twice the firepower
34
and three times the range of Saar. It is designed to
operate for long periods at sea while providing increased
capability to patrol coastal areas.
Thus, by 1975, the Israeli navy became truly a
patrol boat force of over 40 units with more being built.
Considering each missile boat has six to eight launchers,
the navy could deploy upwards of 200 Gabriels , now




"Israel's New Missile-Armed Patrol Boats," International
Defense Review




miles. Also, the 24 missile boats now in service have
the versatility to be used as gunboats, while others will
employ an anti-submarine warfare capability.
35Cohen, Irvine J., "Israeli Missile Boats," National
Defense
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1. Political and Economic Structure
An examination of current Egyptian politics must
necessarily begin in 1952 when a junta calling themselves
the "Free Officers," led by General Muhammed Nagib and
Colonel Nasir, succeeded in overthrowing King Farouq in a
military coup. From that time on, the story is one of
Egyptian attempts at securing arms from the West and then
eventually from the U.S.S.R. to enable the Nasir regime to
solidify the leadership of the Arab States and mount an
effective program against Israel. Indeed, it was Nasir
himself who promoted the major policies which challenged
Western supremacy in the Middle East, while British pro-
motion of the Baghdad Pact pushed Egypt into relations with
the Soviet Union. The heavy military requirements of two
major wars have made Egypt dependent upon the U.S.S.R., with
the resultant problem of maintaining the advantage of Soviet
aid while upholding its own national interests. ' But by
the early seventies, the new president, Anwar Sadat, found
extreme differences with his Russian trading partner and
36








relations cooled considerably to the extent that the Soviets
became "personna non grata" while the U.S. Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger appears to have re-established a favorable
climate between their respective countries.
Egypt's economic condition was seriously damaged
both by the closure of the Suez Canal and by the tremendous
costs of the military effort against Israel. The population
has grown steadily while agriculture has not kept pace with
demand. Attempts have been made to establish industry, both
basic and heavy, concentrating on electricity, minerals and
oil products. Heavy dependence on foreign-supplied war
materials has also created a limited ability to manufacture
weapons domestically.
2. Strategic Considerations
First and foremost is Egypt's command of the Suez
Canal linking the oil-rich Persian Gulf with Western Europe.
Added to this is the radicalism of Egyptian policies in
regard to the other Arab states and the unsettled Israeli
problem. As long as the Soviet Union can play Arab nationalism
against the West, Egyptian politics and attitudes will provide
the opportunity. The conflict with Israel based on terri-
torial claims and occupancy is far from settled, while long-
standing passions and distrust prevent an easy solution.
60

Finally, Egyptian defeats at the hands of numerically in-
ferior Israelis has often been attributed to low morale and
ineffective leadership within the military officership. The
dependence upon Soviet arms has created an army dependent
upon outsiders for parts, training, and technical instruction.
The cessation of Soviet military aid to Egypt thus places
her in an extremely vulnerable position, not only militarily
with regard to Israel, but politically as the self -proclaimed
leader of the Arab world.
3 . Defense Structure
The President of the Republic is the supreme commander-
in-chief of the unified armed forces and presides over the
National Defense Council. There is a single military Com-
mander-in-Chief over the armed forces with direct access to
the President and who is not responsible to the War Minister. 38
Total personnel under arms numbers over 300,000 of which
about 14,000 are in the naval forces. The commander of the
navy is directly subordinate to the chief of staff of the
armed forces who is also deputy commander in chief. Despite
having the largest armed force of any Arab country, Egypt's





main influence in an East-West confrontation is seen as
diplomatic rather than military.
4 . Force Composition
In the first half of the 50' s, the Egyptian Navy
received 10 vessels from Britain, which included destroyers,
corvettes, and torpedo boats. From 1956 until the present,
the Soviet Union has supplied the vast majority of naval
craft including eight Komar and 12 Osa missile boats in the
period between 1962 and 1966. It was the acquisition of these
units that more than any other factor contributed to the
drive toward fast patrol craft, especially for the Israeli
Navy.
In 1960, the Egyptian Navy had 22 vessels in the
categories DES , FRI , COR, and MIN, and 51 in the patrol group
for a 707o ratio of patrol to total. This figure remains
essentially the same for 1976. By comparison, the Israeli
Navy had 707o patrol craft in 1960 with four large units, but
in 1976, there are 40 patrol craft and no large combatants.
Not only has Israel's Navy shown significant growth (167%)
but patrol craft constitute 1007o of the total.
39Smith, Harvey H. , and others, American University Area
Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Egypt)
,
p. 454, U.S.
Govt. Printing Office, October 1970.
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Although it may appear that Egypt has placed emphasis
on large combatants, the fact is that she has simply retained
the British destroyers and frigates acquired earlier while
gladly accepting four aging Skory class destroyers from the
U.S.S.R. The 48 torpedo boats on hand in 1960 have since
been complimented with 22 missile and gunboats, thus rounding
out the force.
40Blackman, op. cit.
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1. Political and Economic Structure
From 1951 until 1969, Libya was ruled as a monarchy
under King Idris, who generally followed a pro-Western
policy. Treaties were signed with Britain and the U.S. for
economic aid in return for military base privileges. Although
a member of the Arab League, her attitude was mainly con-
servative, despite urgings for alignment with Egypt. Under
Nasser's call for expulsion of Westerners, the U.S. and
Britain were forced to withdraw their forces.
In a bloodless coup d'etat in 1969, the King was
deposed, the constitution abolished, and a new government
under the Revolutionary Command Council formed. Colonel
Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi was named Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces and in 1970 became Prime Minister. The Qadhafi
regime has turned in support of the other Arab States and in
1971, announced a tri-partite union with Egypt and Syria.
In 1959, oil was discovered and by 1967, revenues
brought in 550 million dollars. Despite rapid urbanization,
757o of the country is engaged in agriculture. In 1970, the
State took over industry and mining and selective investments
in foreign enterprises have been made.







Oil is the key to Libya's strategic importance as
the North African fields reduce dependence on Middle Eastern
sources for Western Europe. In 1971, Libya received highly
favorable concessions from foreign oil companies after threats
of nationalization were made, and production was expected to
exceed two billion dollars by 1971. U.S. companies account
for about 90% of production while Libya has formed her own
national company. The closure of the Suez Canal had added
immeasurably to the strategic importance of North African
oil, and even with its re-opening in 1975, the size of the
supertankers which many nations rely on will preclude their




As a result of the coup of 1969, Qadhafi became both
Prime Minister and Defense Minister, and thus Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces. In 1972, the chief of staff was
LtCol Abu Jahbir who also serves as Army commander and is
directly reported to by the Air Force and Navy commanders .^
^ 2Shimoni, op. cit. , p. 283.
43Nyrop, Richard F., and others, American University
Area Handbook for Libya
. 2nd ed.
,




Army organization was patterned after the British, but has
become heavily influenced by France and Egypt.
4. Force Composition
The navy was formed in 1962 and two inshore mine-
sweepers were loaned by Britain to form the nucleus of the
new force, and in the following nine years was to supply 18
more vessels, including a modern frigate, corvette, and
logistics supply ship.^ Significantly, three Susa class
missile boats built by Vosper Limited were obtained in 1973
and are the first vessels to be armed with the Nord SS 12(M)
missile. Similarly, the Frigate Dat Assawari is also armed
with missiles, the British-built Seacat.
Thus, the Libyan Navy has seen rapid growth since
its formation in 1962, but its battle efficiency remains
suspect. Despite turning away from Western influence, the
Navy still relies on British weapons, while the Air Force
has acquired French and U.S. craft, and the Army Soviet tanks
and amphibious vehicles. With her oil reserves and new-found
friends among her Arab neighbors, it would seem likely that
the armed forces will increase both in size and sophistica-
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1. Political and Economic Structure
Tunisia won independence from France in 195 6 under
the leadership of Habib Bourguiba, who has been President
since 1967. He is considered a moderate and is pro-Western
in the conduct of foreign policy. Tunisia's failure to take
a strong stand against Israel has caused friction with other
Arab States but the June War of 1967 brought her back within
the fold. Relations with Egypt have been cyclic as Bourguiba
condemned Nasir's dictatorial attitudes toward the Arab League
and his unacceptance of any responsibility for the June War
defeat. Thus, Bourguiba is viewed with suspicion by his
Arab neighbors because of his attempts to resolve the Israeli
problem through more moderate means, and his expressed
policies toward the West.
The Tunisian economy is agrarian although steel and
iron production is adequate. Oil reserves should prove
sufficient for domestic use. The presence of the French
until 1962 had a favorable effect upon improving communica-
tions, transportation, and small craft industries.
2. Strategic Considerations
Physically, Tunisia is in strategic proximity to the
Sicillian Straits, and once Bourguiba is no longer President,
69

a more radical leadership would increase the significance of
Libya's adjacency to that waterway. Perhaps the Tunisian
Navy will not in itself pose a serious threat, but control
of the Strait by Tunisian-based forces would pose consider-
able problems, especially through the use of undersea forces,
mine warfare, and shore-based anti-shipping weapons. But
the continuation of the moderate attitudes of Bourguiba '
s
successors would ensure the discontinuity of an aggressive




Bourguiba has deliberately attempted to minimize
the role of the military in internal politics . Thus he has
kept the army weak to prevent possible coups. •> The military
has been allowed to grow to levels adequate for domestic
needs and to assist Arab causes, but not to the extent of
over -commitment. The President is also Commander-in-Chief,
while the Army Commander has authority over the Navy, which
is an adjunct branch and thus subordinate.
4. Force Composition
The Navy was formed in 1959 as a component of the






The Tunisian military under Bourguiba has played an impor-
tant social role, both in providing manpower for civil work
projects and in education of recruits.
The Tunisian Navy has a strong French orientation
and most of the ships are French-built. Personnel in 1975
numbered about 2,100 and combatants 19, as opposed to one
Corvette and one Fast Gunboat for the first ten years of
operation. The Navy has shown a high growth rate (8507o) in
the seventies although past involvements in the Arab-Israeli
conflicts would not warrant it. Yet, the navy is staffed
with high quality officers, and a combination of Arab sus-
picion and French influence may have convinced the government
of the need for a credible force at sea. The acquisition
of three missile-armed P 48 class patrol boats constitutes
46
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1. Political and Economic Structure
Algeria received independence from France in 1962
under the leadership of Muhammad Ben Bella. A coup d'etat
in 1965 put Colonel Houari Boumedienne in charge as President
of the Council of the Revolution. Ben Bella was considered
by many as a "Nasirist" but soon began to take Algeria on
an independent course. The coup was partially inspired by
Ben Bella's apparent attempt to challenge Nasir for Arab
leadership. However, the new government appears to be
acceptable to the other Arab States, especially in view of
the hard anti-Israel attitude.
Algeria began receiving Soviet arms in 1960, funnel
-
ing them through Morocco, Tunisia, and the UAR to avoid
direct confrontation with France, while arms received after
1963 were used in the Moroccan border dispute. Boumedienne '
s
rise to power was heavily dependent on support from the
armed forces and continues to conduct foreign policy in
extremist fashion.
Algeria has significant oil and natural gas reserves,
but until 1966, was heavily dependent on France for foreign
trade. The area along the Moroccan border is rich in
minerals but is in dispute as its limits are not well defined
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and has been the object of numerous conflicts. The combina-
tion of oil production and foreign aid has enabled the
maintenance of a relatively large military force to compli-
ment Boumedienne ' s extremist policies.
2. Strategic Considerations
Algeria, along with Morocco, occupies the southern
approaches to the Gibraltar exit with approximately 100
nautical miles separating the naval base at Oran with the
nearest point on the Spanish coast. Secondly, Soviet rela-
tions with Algeria provide a point of contact for the
projection and influence of the Russian Mediterranean Fleet.
An established military stronghold in Algeria would seriously
jeopardize the security of NATO's southern flank. And finally,
the extremist policies of the Algerian government provide
a continuous source of tension and unrest among members of




President Boumedienne is the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces as well as Defense Minister. The National
People's Army (ANP) represents the entire military establish-
ment and is considered the most unified and representative
institution in the national life. It was Boumedienne '
s
47Nyrop, Richard F., and others, American University




goal to create a unified force, and the success of the ANP
and its support of the President has promoted solidarity
within the country.
4. Force Composition
The navy was formed in 1962 with two coastal mine-
sweepers from Egypt composing its nucleus. Shortly there-
after, Soviet aid consisting of torpedo boats, sub-chasers,
and missile patrol craft was received. The bulk of arms
aid came between 1965 and 1967 while relations with the
Soviets deteriorated after the June '67 War. It appears
the Algerians were somewhat dismayed by Egyptian dependence
on Soviet weapons, and in December 1967, it was reported
that the Soviets refused to supply spare parts for the
Algerian forces.
Due to Egyptian and Soviet arms deals, the Algerian
Navy grew from two mine sweepers in 1962 to some 29 combatants
in 1975, of which nine are missile-firing Komar and Osa
patrol craft. This represents over 10007c growth in 13 years,
and while the forces consist of minor combatants, the combined
missile boats represent 24 Styx missiles, only one of which
was required to severely cripple the Elath in 1967. As long
as the Soviets continue relations with Algeria, this force
must be given serious consideration in both the context of
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1 . Political and Economic Structure
Morocco gained independence from France in 1956 and
has been ruled by King Hassan II since that time. The govern-
ment was initially passive regarding Arab affairs but in 1958
joined the Arab League. Clashes with Algeria made her wary
of the radical left yet played host to the Casablanca Con-
ference in 1961 which sought to unify African states.
Morocco has remained friendly to the West but takes a neutral
stand in inter-Arab affairs while following a hostile attitude
toward Israel.
The Moroccan economy profitted from European presence
as highways and public facilities were developed. Phosphate
mining was begun along with coal, and domestic oil production
supplies domestic needs. The mineral-rich mountains along





Morocco is the only Arab state bordering both the
Atlantic and Mediterranean and shares with Spain the narrow
neck of the Gibraltar Straits. Morocco's importance is
easily realized as a counter to Algerian-based aggression,
both in detering sea-denial operations and limiting inter-Arab
77

hostilities. The neutralist attitudes of the present regime
as well as favorable policies toward the West would facili-
tate development of Moroccan leadership in the Organization
for African Unity and as a bastion against the spread of
Soviet influence across North Africa. Yet the conservative
stand in regard to radical leftists and the Israeli issue has
given cause for internal disorder, thereby posing the most
serious problem to the Monarchy.
3. Defense Structure
The King is Chief of the General Staff and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces and makes appointments such as
Army Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense. The army is
the principal service as is the case with most of the Arab
states. The military forces are the largest single disci-
plined group within the country and perform many public
services, thereby gaining a degree of prestige and respect
among the populace. The navy and air force have received
minimal emphasis and would hardly deter a sustained attack.
Two attempted coups by military officers have resulted in a
scarcity of good leadership within the military, thus further
weakening an already questionable defense force.
4. Force Composition
Morocco has relied principally on the U.S., France,
and the U.S.S.R. for military aid. In the early sixties,
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the U.S. and the Soviet Union competed in arms shipments,
with the Soviets temporarily abstaining during the Algerian
border clashes. French aid came mostly in the period
immediately after independence although the entire composi-
tion of the navy today is of French origin.
The navy was formed in 1960 as a branch of the army
with the arrival from France of an ex-U.S. sub chaser. There
has been a gradual build-up of the navy since that time with
emphasis on the fast patrol craft, although the navy's flag-
ship is a 2,150 ton frigate of British origin. According to
Jane's 1975-76, the Moroccans have several more patrol craft
on order from France. In that the French are leading
builders of these craft as well as exporters of the Otomat
and Exocet anti-shipping missiles, it would seem likely that
the Moroccan Navy would receive vessels with a missile-firing
capability. In fact, the two Corvettes currently on hand
and the two on order are possible candidates for missile
retro-fit, and are reported to be actually armed with Exocet. -^
This data does not appear in the primary source literature for
this study and therefore was not included in the following
graph for Morocco.
49^Blackman, op. cit. , 1975-76, p. 242.
50Boehe, Rolf, "Modern Fast Patrol Boats," International
Defense Review
,
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1. Overall Average Size (Figure 1)
In 1960, displacement of combatants ranged from two
Egyptian destroyers (ex-Soviet Skoryi class) at 3,500 tons
to three Lebanese patrol boats at 28 tons. Although 28 tons
is extremely small, it is significant to point out that these
three craft represent three-fourths of the entire naval force
of that country. Displacement average at this time is 370
tons with 74% of the total 112 craft being patrol vessels.
In 1965 there was a small increase in average size
to 410 tons as the percentage of patrol craft decreased to
727o and destroyer totals increased from six to ten. Also,
Algeria, Libya, and Syria acquired six mine warfare craft
between them. By 1970, patrol craft comprised 857Q of the
total of 211 combatants with Fast Patrol Missile (FPM) making
the largest gain, three in 1965 to 52 in 1970.
In 1975, patrol craft still represent 857. of the
total which has by now increased to 236 units. Again, it
must be pointed out that this total is only for the vessels
as described for this study. There are numerous other craft,
assault, supply, auxiliary, etc. that are not mentioned.
Further, many craft were either too small or were under
construction or on order and thus were also excluded.
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2. Overall Average Speed (Figure 1)
Average speed in 1960 was 31 knots, the lowest cate-
gory being mine warfare craft at 15 knots and the highest
being torpedo boats at 40 knots. By 1965, the average speed
has held fairly steady as the percentage of patrol craft
changed by only 2%. Five years later, average speed in-
creased to 34 knots as the large increase in Fast Patrol
Missile boats brought the speed up. Finally, by 1975, the
average speed has shown a slight decrease as the number of
somewhat slower FPGs increased as did the PAT category.
It would appear that given the size constraints and
operating conditions of the Mediterranean, the planing-hull
design of these craft has reached the maximum speed for the
amount of powerplant that can be installed. Most of the
craft in this study incorporate either diesel or gas turbine
engines and in some cases, a combination of the two. Yet no
country examined here has acquired hydrofoil craft as has
the Italian Navy, nor have the so-called surface effect ships
made an appearance, although operating conditions are con-
ducive to both types. The greater stability of the hydro-
foil is especially suited to missile launch requirements but
the higher costs of these craft make them less attractive
to the already-proven planing hulls.
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3. Average Speed and Size Comparisons (Figure 2)
The fifteen year period has seen a slight but gradual
increase in the size of patrol craft while vessels in the
"Other" category showed a large increase in 1970 and then
returning to the average of 1,300 tons in 1975. The most
contributing factor in the size reduction was due to Egypt's
loss of two Skory's and Israel's deletion of her two
destroyers as she became more patrol boat oriented.
The difference in speed between the two categories,
Patrol and Other, has held at about 15 knots, although the
past few years have seen the differential at about 13 knots.
The smaller patrol craft, those at about 100 tons, are
particularly high speed, usually above 40 knots. For example,
Libya's Susa class missile boats displace 114 tons and have
a top speed of 54 knots. Those craft in the 400 to 500 ton
class such as Israel's new Reshef class boat generally tend
to be five to ten knots slower.
4. Cumulative Total Comparison (Figure 3)
In 1960, the total number of craft of all nine
countries was 112, 74% of which were patrol boats. In five
years, patrol units increased by 287o while "Other" increased
by 457o. The two categories having the greatest increases
were mine warfare and patrol gunboat. In the early sixties,
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the formation of new navies often began with the acquisition
of several second-hand mine sweepers or a half dozen fast
gunboats. By 1970, patrol craft increased by 687, while
"Other" decreased by 327,. The two significant factors during
this period are Soviet aid to Syria, Egypt, and Algeria, and
the 1967 War which caused the loss of a great deal of equip-
ment. Also at this time, Israel had reacted to the Komar
missile boats introduced by the Soviets and by 1968 had Saar
units operational.
Finally, by 1975, patrol craft increased by 13%
while "Other" units made an identical advance. Total units
at this time number 201 in the Patrol category and 35 in
the "Other." The overall rate of increase for patrol craft
from 1960 to 1975 is about 707, while for the same period,
"Other" had a 217o rate of increase. These figures are in-
tended only to give an appreciation of the trends of naval
development in the region. The exact figures will vary
slightly depending upon how the classes are grouped, which
classes are excluded and which are simply discounted.
Figure 4 indicates the relative percentage of patrol
craft to "Other" for the entire period. The most significant
change occurs between 1965 and 1970, which, as has been
mentioned, is the period of greatest military aid and/or
84

arms purchases as well as combat losses. Now that all the
countries have a navy established, it would seem that the
period from 1975 to 1980 will see a continuing growth both
in numbers and in sophistication of armaments. Due to the
rather limited manpower resources of many of the smaller
countries such as Lebanon and Tunisia, these navies will
probably peak out sooner than a country such as Syria or
Libya. Depending upon political constraints and economic
factors, each navy will increase to the point that foreign
and domestic objectives will be achieved and the security
and balance of power in the region will be maintained.
Certainly this will not be a static level as local conflicts,
super power interests, and economic developments will impose
their effects upon the entire area.
Most significantly, the patrol boat has given the navies
of the Mediterranean a naval voice. The U.S. and Soviet
Union have operated their respective fleets with little
regard for the naval forces of the southern and eastern
littoral region. The missions of projection and presence
will have to be re-examined in the light of a changing picture
as perceptions of threat and coercion, victim and assailant,
are surely being altered. The growing inability of the super
powers to control the Middle East conflicts as well as
85

emerging economic independence of the oil -rich Arab States
has created an atmosphere necessitating strong armed forces
just to keep current with local developments . The wave of
Arab nationalism required that member nations have the
capability to act in their own behalf without the approval
of foreign interests. In this regard, a visible naval force
for the purposes of diplomatic persuasion can be achieved with
even an all-patrol boat navy such as that of Israel.
86
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IV. FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCED NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
For the greater part of the twentieth century, the
history of the Middle East has revolved around two general
pivotal factors: foreign intervention and internal unrest.
In the first part of this century, Allied strategies sought
to control and eliminate Axis encroachments in North Africa
and secure the Turkish Straits. Since the end of the Second
World War, the expansion of Soviet interest and the U.S.
opposition to it have driven these two powers on a collision
course that has yet to be avoided. Recently-developed
economic potentials have attracted the attention of a bevy
of international merchants all seeking favorable trading
status, some for commercial gain, others for political
advantage or both.
In addition to the economic and political pressures from
without, the very same pressures have manifestly operated
from within. For all the questionable virtues of colonialism,
there is concomitantly a degree of economic stability. Thus,
with the emergence of Arab independence by the 1950' s, there
emerged as well the need for survival in a competitive
environment. To add the final ingredient, the turmoil of
political unrest resulting from the creation of the Jewish
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State in 1948 has kept the Middle East in the forefront for
maximum exploitation and diplomatic intrigue. It is in
this light that the factors influencing the development of
naval forces in the Mediterranean will be examined. Arab
Independence , the Dispute with Israel , and Foreign Power
Interests were all interrelated in creating a need for
military forces. Some observers have pointed out the minimal
role played by naval forces in what have essentially been
land wars between small non-maritime nations. This is in-
deed true, but as the sixties have shown, the naval com-
ponents of most of the subject countries were under the army
and thus played limited roles in combat. But the 1973 Yom
Kippur War demonstrated the feasibility of naval weapon's
use, weapons that would not have been used were they not
supplied by outside interests. And finally, it has been
shown that the value of naval weapons lies as much in their
capacity to influence action and thought as in their ability
to conduct military operations upon the sea. As soon as the
Soviets supplied missile boats to Syria, Egypt, and Algeria,
it became necessary for the Western States to restore that




British influence in Egypt began in the late nineteenth
century and ended with the ill-conceived Suez crisis of
1956. Similarly, British hegemony over Palestine lasted
until 1948 although the complexities of the Arab-Zionist
dispute precluded the establishment of an effective governing
institution. French interest in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia
was in part motivated out of need for recruitment for military
service in support of policies for consolidation of power in
North Africa. In the East, the French established military
administrations in Syria and Lebanon in the early twenties
in defense of the Levant. Libya received the attentions of
Facist Italy and supplied two divisions of men at the out-
break of war in 1940.
With the defeat of France, Britain sought to mobilize
her dependencies in the Middle East for the war effort.
Meanwhile, Palestinian Nationalists feared a British victory
would be detrimental to the cause of Arab nationalism and
thus opposed the British war effort. In Egypt, a mutual
distrust kept the Egyptian government from sympathy with
England's troubles, resulting in little or no modernization
of the Egyptian Army.
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The French mandated Syria and Lebanon to Britain but
kept her holdings in North Africa for the War's duration,
although Libya came under British admins trat ion. In 1945-
46, Stalin attempted to expand his holdings by seizing the
Turkish Straits, but his gamble failed. The United States
countered by offering to uphold the security of the states
beyond Russian dominance via the "Truman Doctrine." In turn,
the Soviets attempted to push France and England completely
out of the Middle East by supporting any nationalist movement
calling for the ouster of the two powers. But Soviet
thrusts into Middle East politics only strengthened American
resolve in the area and thus caused her to become more
committed.
This concern for containing the Soviet outward movement
led to the creation of the "Northern Tier" strategy designed
to provide a physical barrier to communism's spread. It
might be argued today that the strategy has failed because
the Soviets leap-frogged the Tier into Syria and Egypt.
However, despite some Soviet advances in the area, she still
has no permanent bases or installations of any kind, witness
her embarrassing setback in Egypt in 1972 after pouring
tremendous amounts of aid into that country. Witness too
the recent failures of the Arab efforts against Israel
utilizing Russian equipment and services.
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Thus, the continued presence of foreign forces on Arab
soil following the end of World War II only added to the
frustrated attempts toward nationalism. Colonial rule had
long been a painful awareness among Arabs, and the need to
establish an Arab national identity was instrumental in the
move toward independence. One by one, the individual states
demanded independence and received it. But strongly differ-
ing opinions and priorities stood in the way of Arab unity,
especially in terms of resolving the Israeli issue and lead-
ership of the Arab Union itself. Independence immediately
produced recognition of the need for arms produced and
supplied from abroad, as none of the Arab States was self-
sufficient in weapons production.
Fortunately for the Soviets, the early fifties found
them in a position to support the Arab cause and therefore
strengthen their own position through the supply of arms.
And so it has been for over two decades that the creation of
independent Arab States gave the Soviets a needed foothold in
the area. What is not so certain is why the Soviets supplied
missile gunboats to Egypt, Algeria and Syria throughout the
decade of the sixties when all indications seemed to point
to a land-air limited conflict arena. But supply them they
did and the pattern was thus firmly established.
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B. THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE
The intense hostility of the Arab States for Israel has
had a profound effect upon the military balance in the Middle
East in two dramatic ways. First and foremost, the conflict
has emphasized the need for armaments. Out of this need has
come the complimentary factor: that of providing the oppor-
tunity for foreign intervention via the supplying of the
needed arms. To be sure, the dispute has further roots.
The displacement of Arab Palestinians, the disunity brought
to the Arab cause as a result of the Jewish State, and the
humiliating losses at the hands of the Israelis have all
added to the problem. But the immediate result has been the
use of weapons and the commitments thereby created between
supplier and client.
Since the early 50 ' s , Israel has relied heavily on arms
support from the West, particularly the United States, France,
and the United Kingdom. The U.S.S.R. soon became convinced
that there was little advantage in supporting Israel since
the seeds of revolution would not have taken hold within the
strongly established state. The Soviets recognized early
the benefit to be gained by supporting the Arab cause. It
offered the opportunity to undermine Western interests while
at the same time establishing their own reputation of
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protective benevolence. The Soviets had much to gain by
contributing to the hostilities that gripped the area. By
supporting the Arabs, they could become firmly entrenched
both politically and militarily, and thus weaken traditional
Western ties. But also, if Arab strength wavered or was
overcome, they would be in a position to replace losses
such as occurred with Egypt after the disastrous June war
in 1967. In six days, a significant portion of Egypt's
military arsenal was destroyed whereupon she demanded re-
supply from her Soviet benefactor. By the end of 1968,
massive aid had replaced weapons lost in the war. Some 39
Osa and Komar missile boats had been provided to Syria,
Egypt, and Algeria and thus had set the scene for the sinking
of the Elath.
The loss of the Elath was not only a personal tragedy to
the Israelis, but was also a sobering event after the exhil-
arating victory of a few months earlier. Despite being
outnumbered four to one, the Israeli Navy had good success
harrassing Egyptian forces and preventing coastal assault
by amphibious units. A small surface force created havoc
in a raid on Port Said while frogmen teams damaged several
ships in the port of Alexandria. The post-1967 period saw
the Soviets provide Egypt with a great number of amphibious
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units, which to the surprise of many, were not used to
support the canal crossing in October of 1973.
Israel was faced with the prospect of guarding a coast-
line that had doubled in length, while at the same time
contending with a growing Soviet Naval threat as well as
Syrian and Egyptian surface forces. Just prior to the June
War, the French had begun work on a new Israeli patrol craft,
the Saar, but had held up delivery as a result of the war.
While Israeli crews were training on the vessels in French
waters in 1969, seven of the craft were sailed to Israel.
Five more were sold to a ficticious Scandinavian fishing
company and subsequently turned up among their sister ships
in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Gabriel anti-shipping missile is of Israeli design
and was to have been incorporated into the first Saars , but
the associated equipment was not ready. The overall concept
of a new weapons platform and delivery vehicle was envisaged
as early as 1961 and the design for the Saar was made by Fr.
Lurssen of Germany. The first twelve craft were finally
outfitted with Gabriels, guns (46mm or 76mm), ASW torpedoes
and sonar. In 1968, the Saar 4 underwent domestic production






October War. In March 1974, they then transitted around
the tip of Africa and became the nucleus of the Red Sea
Force. This move was necessitated by the Egyptian blocking
of the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb with a destroyer and a sub-
marine, thus preventing Israeli ships from re-supplying
Haifa. In a longer war, this could have meant the loss of
Sharm-es -Sheikh commanding the Gulf of Aqaba. This was
probably the single most effective operation by the Egyptian
Navy of the entire war, because in the Mediterranean the
Saar boats were clearly superior to the Osa and Komar units.
On the night of 6 October 1973, Saar boats swept along
the Syrian and Egyptian coasts, sinking three Osas , a PT
Boat, and a minesweeper off Latakia. The Egyptians lost
four Osas in the first two nights of battle and soon began
the tactic of launching their Styx missiles at maximum range
and then immediately returning to port before the shorter
ranged Gabriels could be put to use. Altogether, ten Osa and
Komar craft were sunk along with several other types of
Egyptian and Syrian units without any losses by the Saars.^ 2
After the initial encounters, the Egyptian and Syrian patrol
craft simply remained in port and the Israeli craft commenced






escort duties ranging hundreds of miles from base and on
occasion refueled at sea. Thus the fast patrol craft of
the Israeli Navy denied Syria and Egypt an important element
necessary to the conduct of war as stipulated by Admiral Mahan:




Unfortunately, Israel suffered such a blockade by the
Egyptians at the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, but the effects never
had the chance to materialize. In a different blockade
attempt during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, Indian Osa missile
boats were used to sink several Pakistani warships near
Karachi Harbor. Later, a single Styx hit an oil tank and
another sank a British Merchantman. Indian forces so well
bottled up the Pakistani Navy that units were reported to
have taken refuge among merchant ships in the harbor.
Within the first 48 hours of hostilities, the Pakistani Navy
had been neutralized. The Osas particularly had negated any
naval offensive by limiting the Pakistani forces to that of
defending Karachi Harbor. Although possessing an aircraft
"TCahan, op . cit
.
, p. 129.
54Kaul, LCDR Ravi, "The Indo-Pakistani War and the
Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1973
, p. 190, 1973.
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carrier, a cruiser, and destroyers, the brunt of Indian
attack was borne by the Osas with extremely effective results.
One final aspect of the super power rivalry as it relates
to the Arab-Israeli conflict concerns the seeming mutual nega-
tion of influence resulting out of the concern to avoid
direct confrontation and conflict escalation. Despite the
stated objectives of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to support their
respective client's interests, it is still the ultimate goal
of avoiding miscalculation that brings caution and discretion
into the conduct of policy and strategy. Thus the Arab
States as well as Israel must accept certain preconditions
when estimating the degree of support they might expect.
As mentioned earlier, the Kremlin used the "hotline" at
the outset of the June War to seek minimum bilateral partici-
pation in that conflict, thereby negating the full effect
either super power could have applied to the situation to the
advantage of the warring parties. Actually, the primary roles
of the U.S. and Soviets became one of controlling the conflict
to the extent that neither side won or lost completely, but
rather spent themselves in a spasmodic attempt to restore
equilibrium. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Soviets
demanded that the U.S. require the Israelis to withdraw to
their positions of 22 October and relieve the threat to the
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Egyptian Third Army. When the U.S. went on world-wide alert,
the Soviets backed down while finally accepting a U.N. Force
to end the crisis. ^
Although the Israelis did not withdraw to the earlier
positions, they were in fact denied a significant military
victory. Similarly, the Egyptians were not provided the
backing of their Russian supporters due to the U.S. alert
and the danger of escalation. It would therefore appear
that a peculiar dilemma had been created in that weapons
were adequately supplied but neither side could win a decisive
victory and intervention on the part of the super powers was
a function of their own mutual consent. For the countries
involved in the struggle, the need for arms is obvious as
long as bipolarity exists and the interests of the super
powers are served through policies of controlled tensions
and preservation of the status quo.
C. FOREIGN POWER INTERESTS
The interests of foreign powers in the Middle East can
be divided into two distinct areas: those interests which
are self-serving, and those which serve the Middle East.
Despite the overwhelming presence of the United States and
Strategic Survey 1973 , The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1974, p. 30.
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Soviet forces in the Mediterranean region, it must be re-
membered that they are the foreigners whose presence has
been and will continue to be maintained with or without local
approval. As long as the factors of strategic deterrence and
oil dependence prevail, the two super powers will have a
vested interest in the area, European concern notwithstanding.
The self-serving interests of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are
opposite in intent but somewhat similar in application. When
the United States first established a permanent presence in
the Middle East in 1947, the initial intent was to contain
the Soviet Union and to fill the power vacuum caused by the
decline of British and French power after the war. Secondly,
the U.S. sought to protect vital Western interests which for
the most part had to do with securing the free flow of oil
as well as providing military bases from which a credible
deterrent could be brought to bear. In her role as the
guarantor of peace and stability in the Middle East, the
greatest challenge faced by the U.S. has not come from any
direct Soviet confrontation, but from Russian exploitation
of militant Arab Nationalism and its attendant instability. '
56Cottrell, Alvin J. and Joshua, Wynfred, "The United
States -Soviet Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean,"
Brassey's Defense Yearbook







The ill-fated Anglo-French intervention in Suez in 1956
essentially ended all significant European presence in the
area with the slack being taken up by the U.S. However,
after the six day war in June 1967, even the Pax Americana
began to decline as the burden became too great to be borne
alone.
The Soviet Union had long sought to end the Western
hegemony as well as expand her own sphere of influence to
the south. As such, she set as a minimum goal the ending
of the Western monopoly and the changing of the political
59
climate toward one of a more neutralist orientation. Also
the oil routes of the Middle East have caught the attention
of the Soviets as well. Their role in the Arab State's use
of oil as a political tool certainly suggests their aware-
ness of Western dependence on petroleum. Finally, an end
to Western military domination of the Mediterranean would
not only remove a thorn from the Soviet southern side, but
would enable the outflanking of NATO from the South. This
would in part be facilitated due to an already diminished
European Naval force in the area as witnessed by the
CO
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departure of French units in the face of the Soviet naval
buildup. 60
The application of Soviet foreign policy since the mid-
fifties has been one of polarization through exacerbation of
the Arab-Israeli dispute with herself as the sole supporter
of Arab interests against U.S. -Israel aggression. Similarly,
the United States has also approached the Middle East situa-
tion within the context of the dispute with Israel but the
aim has been toward resolution of the conflict and anti-
polarization of the Arab States. The politics of controlled
tension have served the Soviets well although two major wars
in six years have brought the two super powers dangerously
close to confrontation.
In serving Middle East interests, the United States, as
already mentioned, sought to fill the political vacuum of
the Anglo-French withdrawal. To do so, she not only inter-
posed her own forces, but began an aid program to those
allies, notably Israel, Tunisia, Morocco, and Lebanon, who
had not become overly committed to the Radical Arab cause
or communist influence. By providing these states with arms,
it not only precluded them from turning to the Soviets as
many others did, but guaranteed the protection of the U.S.
Hager, Wolfgang, "The Mediterranean: A European Mare
Nostrum," Orbis




from foreign intervention. The Soviets likewise used mili-
tary aid as the bargaining tool to gain Arab confidence and
defend against U.S. -led encroachment. In so doing, the
Soviets greatly furthered their goals of ending the Western
monopoly and altering the political climate through the
exploitation of the move for nationalism and the conflict
with Israel.
For the super powers, the Middle East rivalry is only
one facet of the global competition in which they are both
engaged, although the Soviets have a more direct and vital
concern for the Mediterranean strategic balance. Similarly,
Europe has an extremely important stake in the area, both
militarily and economically. She is as strong as the Soviet
Union in economic potential, and the combined NATO forces
are of immediate concern to Soviet military planners. Yet
it is Europe's resistance to unity, first by Britain and then
by de Gaulle that her influence has become virtually nil,
and nowhere is this weakness more significant than in the
61
oil-rich Middle East. It has been in the arms race arena
that countries such as West Germany, France, Britain, Sweden,
and Yugoslavia have sought to regain a measure of interest
if only to win new customers for needed weapons.
61
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A final factor contributing to the arms build-up in the
Middle East has been the tremendous revenues made available
through the greatly increased price of oil. Iran, for
example, ordered $2.5 billion dollars in arms from the
United States in 1972 in what appears to be an attempt to
62dominate the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia has threatened to
curtail oil production to the West if the U.S. does not
develop more favorable policies toward the Arab cause. Thus
not only have the Arab States gained the wealth to purchase
weapons, but they are gradually assuming control over arms
purchases to the Middle East, a control long assumed to lie
with the industrial nations. The politics of arms transfer
and the leverage it provides may eventually be denied even
the super powers as nations in economic straits such as
Britain will be forced to sell weapons despite the dictates
of prudent security interests. Middle East control of the
arms trade along with diminishing super power control of
their warring proteges has placed mounting pressure on the
establishment of credible forces, be they naval, land, or
air, while the emergence of a buyer's market has found no
short supply of eager sellers.
6
^Duchene, Francois, "The Arms Trade and the Middle East,"
The Political Quarterly
, p. 461, The Political Quarterly




A. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
It has been the intent of this study to describe the
evolution of the naval forces of selected countries of the
southern and eastern Mediterranean with emphasis on the
degree to which patrol craft have become a part of those
forces. Secondly, the study examined various factors that
would explain the need as well as the direction of that
development. Finally, this concluding chapter will present
several speculatory considerations involving future uses
and implications regarding fast patrol craft and the anti-
shipping missile.
Although the sinking of the Elath by the Styx missile is
generally regarded as a turning point in naval weaponry in
the Mediterranean, the existence of missile patrol craft
dates back to the early sixties when Soviet-supplied Komars
were operated by Egypt, to be followed in 1967 by Algeria
and Syria. The Elath incident was conclusive proof that the
naval threat to Israel was real, whereupon she began an
immediate transformation of her navy to smaller and faster
craft. In early 1968, the first French-built Saars began
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to arrive and were to be equipped with Israeli-developed
Gabriel missiles.
Libya and Tunisia acquired missile boats in 1968 and
1970 respectively and by 1975 approximately 58 missile-armed
units were being operated by the six countries. This repre-
sents a total of well over 250 missiles from the littoral
States alone, and this figure does not include any of the
navies of the northern Mediterranean. As earlier indicated,
for the purposes of consistency as well as classification,
all data was extracted from Jane's Fighting Ships although
other sources would indicate slightly differing numbers of
units. Additionally, certain sources indicate proposed
future acquisitions of patrol vessels which were not reflected
in Jane's. This data, however, only serves to verify and
further illustrate the significance of the findings of this
study.
The fifteen year period from 1960-1975 revealed a trend
of increasing reliance on patrol craft. In 1960, these
vessels constituted 74% of the total units of all the countries
of the study, and in 1975 had risen to 85%. In actual numbers,
this represents 201 Fast Patrol craft versus 35 "Other" craft
in 1975, as opposed to 83 and 29 respectively in 1960, of
which none were missile-equipped.
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A country-by-country comparison was made in which the
factors of politics, economics, strategic considerations,
defense structure, and force composition were presented.
Generally, it was found that those countries closely allied
with the Soviet Union or the Arab cause were well prepared
to engage in open conflict with some degree of confidence of
victory. However, the more Western oriented states such as
Lebanon, Cyprus, Morocco and Tunisia were found to be less
capable of even self defense due to a more moderate govern-
ment or a less military-influenced regime. Israel fits
neither case although her military capabilities are quite
evident. She has acquired the capability to manufacture or
maintain most of her own equipment and thus avoids the
dependence on the Soviet Union for maintenance services as
discovered by many of her antagonists.
Three factors were offered that are considered to be of
principal import in influencing the need for arms among the
Middle East nations: Arab Independence, the Arab-Israeli
Dispute, and Foreign Power Interests. The withdrawal of
European presence introduced the need for economic survival
and military support. The combination of Arab Nationalism
and the creation of the Jewish State created an arena of
hostility which placed great emphasis on the need and
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implementation of arms. The Soviet Union was quick to champion
the Arab cause and supply her clients with whatever equipment
seemed necessary to destroy Israel and dispel Western influ-
ence in the ara. The United States sought to fill the vacuum
created by the withdrawal of France and Britain as well as
oppose the Soviet advance throughout the Mediterranean. The
common denominator of both superpower's policies was the
transfer of arms to eager recipients. The U.S.S.R. attempted
to gain Arab support through military aid as well as insti-
gate polarization of the region by exacerbation of the conflict
with Israel. The U.S. on the other hand offered arms in an
attempt to prevent states from turning to the Soviets. De-
spite the rival interests of the super powers in arming
their respective proteges, their agreed upon and overriding
concern has been the avoidance of direct confrontation. This
has led to what many perceive as a form of strategic parity
by which neither power will fully support a client at the
risk of war. This stalemate has further underscored the
need for individual states to be self-reliant in terms of
military strength. A final factor pertaining to naval
development has been the huge revenues brought in by Middle
East and North African oil. This factor has not only meant
that forces can now be bought outright without binding
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commitment, but that control of the arms race is shifting to
the Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia who is reputed to
have financed efforts against Israel. With many European
economies sagging, and the dependence on oil only too real,
it can be reasonably assumed that the flow of arms into the
Mediterranean region will continue unabated, thereby under-
mining the strategies and foreign policy interests of the
rival super powers and presenting future complexities sur-
passing those of the present.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The most immediate concern of naval observers is the
marked proliferation of missile-firing patrol craft world-
wide. The proven combat effectiveness of these weapons has
been amply demonstrated and their relatively inexpensive
price tag and low operating costs have made them especially
attractive to many of the small emerging navies. As early
as 1973, over thirty countries were operating or had ordered
missile patrol boats. Significantly, many of these countries
lie in close proximity to the strategic waterways of the
world's trading routes, countries such as Cuba, Morocco,
62Baker, Arthur Davidson III, "Small Combatants 1972-




Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Denmark, Sweden, India, Iran,
Iraq, Maylasia, and Indonesia.
In many cases, there are only two or three of these
craft in operation for a given country, yet the multiplicity
of launchers per vessel and quick turn around time offers a
credible threat to ships of all sizes. In the absence of
air attack, a fleet of fast missile boats presents as great
a hazard to shipping or potential adversaries as the tradi-
tional fleets of battleships and destroyers. Iran in
particular has shown intentions of asserting her influence
throughout the Persian Gulf and beyond the Straits of Hormuz
64into the Indian Ocean. To help accomplish this mission,
she has ordered a dozen "La Combattante II" class patrol
boats equipped with "Exocet" missiles. These craft are
ideally suited for operations in an environment such as the
Persian Gulf and should provide an adequate counterpart to
Iraq's Soviet-built Osa missile boats.
In 1967, Maylasia was in a position similar to Israel's
as she faced the threat of Indonesian Komar missile boats.
To regain some semblance of naval balance, she had four
Brave class fast patrol boats retro-fitted with Nord SS-12
64-Harrigan, Anthony, "Security Interests in the Persian





wire-guided missiles. Thus, regardless of the effectiveness
of such craft, they still present an aspect of naval power
as outlined by Admiral Mahan in that there is a "fleet- in-
being" effect which must be taken into account by potential
adversaries. This fleet may be small and even ineffectual,
but until neutralized, it remains a factor in overall planning
A potential role of patrol boat navies attractive to
more extreme or radical elements involves guerrilla tactics
at sea. A fast strike, without warning, and an immediate
retreat is perfectly suited to patrol boat operations and
has the added feature of seeming to escape the condemnation
of world authorities. In particular, an attack by an un-
marked craft on the Israeli-chartered tanker Coral Sea in the
Straits of Bab el Mandeb in 1971 brought no reprisals, yet
a seeming foolhardy attempt to capture the U.S. container
ship Mayaguez resulted in immediate strikes against Cambodian
installations by 7th Fleet units. Despite that extremely
limited naval action in the Red Sea by fedayeen extremists,
the Israeli Navy still had to consider this threat to their
shipping in the area. Similarly, 7th Fleet commanders
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forces, especially in view of the original attacks upon
U.S. warships in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 which precipi-
tated in part United States' involvement in Southeast Asia.
Finally, the fast patrol craft may be seen to have seri-
ously undermined the role of "showing the flag" or "Gunboat
Diplomacy" as a means of influencing the actions of others
through the noncombat use of naval vessels. Despite the
fact that a Soviet Kynda missile cruiser may easily dispatch
a patrol boat, it is in fact the perceived capabilities by
the operators of that patrol craft that offers immunity to
such coercion. The Soviets must therefore convince their
intended victim of impending danger in order to effectively
apply naval persuasion, yet it is the perhaps over-
exaggerated sense of security offered by a few patrol boats
that makes that act of coercion less credible. And herein
lies possibly the greatest attribute of these weapons:
their inherent quality of credible effectiveness combined
with an impression of unobtrusiveness . The patrol boat
offers at once instant reputation with humbled authority at
a price none can afford not to pay. The future of naval
strategies will in large part depend upon the extent and
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